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This year, the Oklahoma courts answered who is liable for royalty 
payments under the PRSA, how a tenant may prove ouster of a cotenant in 
an adverse possession proceeding, how to sever a joint tenancy involving 
more than two parties, and how can a court analyze a will which includes a 
complete restraint on alienation. 
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In the federal courts, the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the Tenth 
Circuit certified class actions related to underpayment of royalties and the 
breach of the implied duty of marketability, while the Tenth Circuit also 
discussed the elements of trespass relate to an expired right-of-way on Native 
American lands. 
I. State Cases 
A. TexasFile, LLC v Boevers, 2019 OK CIV APP 20, 437 P.3d 2111 
TexasFile involved whether or not the Oklahoma Open Records Act 
allows a county clerk to provide electronic access to county land records. 
TexasFile provides its customers with access to county land records via 
the internet. In May of 2016, TexasFile requested a “complete electronic 
copy of all the Kingfisher County land records that are currently available in 
electronic format” pursuant to the Oklahoma Open Records Act, specifically 
all records available on the Oklahoma County Records website.2 TexasFile 
did not request the tract indices. The Kingfisher County clerk did not respond 
to this request. 
In January of 2017, TexasFile made a second request, and acknowledged 
Oklahoma, Blaine, and Logan counties had recently complied with such 
requests.3 
In May of 2017, Jeannie Boevers, Kingfisher County Clerk, denied the 
request, explaining the request: 
does not fall within the provisions of the Act as interpreted by the 
Oklahoma Supreme County in County Records, Inc. v 
Armstrong.[4] Neither the tract index nor the date (land records) 
inextricably linked to the computer software can be provided for 
resale. Commercial use or dissemination of these records if 
prohibited. You are welcome to come to my office like all other 
persons to inspect and copy documents.5 
In response, TexasFile filed a declaratory judgment and mandamus action 
against Boevers asking the trial court to determine it was entitled to an 
electronic copy of the Kingfisher County land records maintained by the 
county clerk. In response, Boevers and Lori Fulks, the Garvin County Clerk 
                                                                                                                 
 1. TexasFile, LLC v. Boevers, 2019 OK CIV APP 20, 437 P.3d 211. 
 2. Id. ¶ 3. 
 3. Id. ¶ 4. 
 4. 2012 OK 60, 299 P.3d 865. 
 5. Id. ¶ 5. 
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(the “County Clerks”), sought a uniform judicial determination of whether 
the Open Records Act requires the County Clerks to hand over their 
electronic files so TexasFile may resell those records.6 
In October of 2017, TexasFile filed a motion for summary judgment 
arguing Boevers had a statutory duty to maintain land records and provide 
electronic copies of those records upon request. TexasFile argued section 
386, title 19 requires Boevers make the public land records available for 
viewing and copying. TexasFile conceded the Open Records Act prohibits 
the copying of the tract index for resale, but the index was not part of the 
request.7 
In February of 2018, the trial court denied TexasFile’s summary judgment 
and granted summary judgment for the County Clerks. The Court of Civil 
Appeals affirmed. 
The court cited the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in County 
Records, Inc. v Armstrong which pointed out “access to instruments of record 
shall be for immediate and lawful abstracting purposes only. The sale of the 
instruments of record for profit to the public either on the internet or any 
other such forum by any company holding a permit to build an abstract plant 
is prohibited.”8 The legislature intended production of the tract index and 
land records would not be limited unless the request is for the sale of that 
information. Therefore, the Open Records Act “prohibits a county clerk form 
providing any documents and data from the land records for the intentional 
sale of that information.”9 
Based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in County Records, Inc. 
v Armstrong, the Court of Civil Appeals ruled the trial court did not err in 
denying TexasFile’s request for the land records. 
B. Hodge v Wright, 2019 OK CIV APP 1010 
Hodge discussed the elements of adverse possession in Oklahoma and 
how a cotenant can show ouster of another cotenant. The Court of Civil 
Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding Hodge had shown an ouster 
of her cotenants and proven title by adverse possession. 
In her 2014 petition, Yvonne Hodge sought to quiet title to a quarter 
section in Noble County, asserting she owned the property individually and 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. ¶ 7. 
 7. Id. ¶ 8-10. 
 8. Id. ¶ 20 (quoting 2012 OK 60, 299 P.3d 865 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.1, §§ 227.10 
through 227.30 (2019))). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Hodge v. Wright, 2019 OK CIV APP 10, 435 P.3d 126. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
218 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
as the personal representative of the estate of her husband, Leroy Hodge.11 
According to Hodge, Mary Roney owned the property upon her death in 
1935, and Mary’s son, Charles Roney, possessed the land until he died in 
1980. When Mary Roney’s estate was probated in 1956, her heirs were 
unknown except for Charles, and starting in 1971, Glen Hodge, Yvonne’s 
father-in-law, leased the land from Charles Roney. After Charles died in 
1980, his estate was distributed to his wife, and when she died, her estate was 
distributed to her two brothers, Ruben Reimer and Sylvester Reimer, in 1982. 
Hodge alleged Sylvester Reimer died in 1982 and his estate was never 
probated in Oklahoma. From 1980 to 1993, Glen Hodge and his son, Leroy, 
leased the property from the Charles Roney Estate, his heirs, or the estates of 
his heirs.12 
Also, Hodge alleged Ruben Reimer’s share was distributed to his children 
in 1993 and Leroy Hodge then bought their interests. Therefore, as of 1993, 
Hodge owned an undivided 1/8 interest in the property. Hodge claimed she 
and her husband Leroy have occupied the property without paying rent to 
another party since 1993, and they have paid taxes, built fences and ponds, 
and cleared trees, resulting in Hodge acquiring full title to the property by 
adverse possession.13 
Hodge alleged the unknown heirs of Sylvester Reimer were one group of 
defendants, who owned a 1/8 surface interest, and the heirs of the seven half 
siblings of Charles Roney were the remaining defendants. Hodge asserted 
Charles Roney held the property adversely to the interests of the half siblings 
from 1935 (Mary Roney’s death) to 1980 (Charles Roney’s death).14 
In an amended petition, Hodge named all potential heirs of Mary Roney’s 
children as defendants, and alleged she satisfied the requirements for adverse 
possession for more than fifteen years.15 
Two of the defendants, Sally Stewart and Christy Allyce Lane, requested 
time to assert an interest in the property. Stewart counterclaimed and asked 
the court to determine her interest in the property and quiet that interest to 
her.16 
The trial court entered default judgment in favor of Hodge against 20 
defendants who had failed to answer, as well as several other defendants. 
However, the trial court denied Hodge’s motion for summary judgment 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. ¶ 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. ¶ 3. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. ¶ 4. 
 16. Id. ¶ 5. 
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against Stewart. The trial court also denied Stewart’s counterclaim for quiet 
title because she did not present any evidence establishing an interest in the 
property, but the court denied Hodge showed she was entitled to the property 
by adverse possession because she was a cotenant, and therefore she must 
prove an ouster of the other cotenants in the property.17 The trial court ruled 
Hodge must go through a partition proceeding. The Court of Civil Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s finding and ruled Hodge had proven title through 
adverse possession. 
The Court of Civil Appeals set out the elements of adverse possession: “to 
establish adverse possession, the claimant must show that possession was 
hostile, under a claim of right or color of title, actual, open, notorious, 
exclusive, and continuous for the statutory period of fifteen years.”18 
The appellate court noted it was undisputed that Hodge met these 
elements. The trial court only denied Hodge’s claim because it ruled the case 
must be analyzed as between cotenants, where the general rule is “the tenant 
in possession is deemed to be holding said possession for himself and for the 
tenant who is not in possession. The possession of the one is constructively 
possession for the other. Thus it is that the mere holding of possession, by 
one tenant, can never be considered adverse to his cotenant until there is some 
act or conduct on his part which must give the other cotenant notice that his 
title has bene repudiated or is disputed by the one in possession, or there must 
be such conduct by the tenant in possession as reasonably would put the other 
tenant on inquiry.”19 
Oklahoma caselaw states more than mere possession is required, but the 
caselaw is unclear as to what acts are sufficient to prove ouster of a cotenant. 
In Westheimer v Neustadt, the court held that collecting rents, paying taxes, 
and representing to the lessee that he owned the property was insufficient to 
operate as an ouster.20 
However, in Wirick v Nance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held a 
cotenant proved title by adverse possession by showing possession was open, 
visible, continuous and exclusive to the point that his title was not in 
subordination to any other claimants of title.21 This case suggested a party 
could prove ouster of a cotenant with the same evidence one might use to 
prove adverse possession against a stranger. The appellate court cited two 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. ¶ 6-7. 
 18. Id. ¶ 8 (citing Akin v. Castleberry, 2012 OK 79, ¶11, 286 P.3d 638). 
 19. Preston v. Preston, 1949 OK 59, ¶20, 207 P.2d 313. 
 20. Westheimer v. Neustadt, 1961 OK 121, 362 P.2d 110, 111. 
 21. Wirick v. Nance, 1936 OK 98, 62 P.2d 997. 
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additional cases in support of the idea that a cotenant could prove ouster with 
similar facts to Hodge’s.22 
The appellate court noted no one ever attempted to assert any claim to the 
property until Hodge filed her quiet title action, and even then, no one 
presented any contrary evidence. Also, the court pointed out a partition 
proceeding would be futile because there was no indication that there is 
anybody else with whom to partition the property. “The purpose of a quiet 
title action is to determine who is the real owner of property and put to rest 
adverse claims.”23 
The trial court did not determine the real owner of the property, and the 
appellate court ruled this was an error. Based on the undisputed evidence, 
Hodge proved she owned the property by adverse possession, so the Court of 
Civil Appeals remanded to the lower court with directions to quiet title to the 
property in Hodge’s name. 
C. Goodson v McCrory, 2018 OK CIV APP 59, 426 P.3d 636.24 
Goodson detailed the requirements for establishing a joint tenancy in title, 
and how one party can sever a joint tenancy. 
In 2001, Kaci Susanne Goodson, Patricia Lynn Farquhar, Mary Beth 
Guzman, and Sherry Doris McCrory were granted property in Tulsa County 
“in equal shares in their individual capacities, as joint tenants, and not as 
tenants in common, on the death of” the grantor. In 2011, the grantor passed 
away.25 
Goodson filed the petition in this case in 2017 for quiet title, declaratory 
relief, and/or a determination of her rights in the property. Goodson contested 
the validity of a 2002 deed wherein Goodson, Farquhar, and Guzman 
purportedly conveyed their interest in the property to McCrory. Goodson 
contested the validity of the 2002 deed as to her interest only and not the 
interests of Farquhar or Guzman.26 
Goodson then filed a motion for summary judgment claiming she did not 
sign the 2002 deed. Her typed name and written signature on the deed were 
misspelled (Goodman instead of Goodson), and McCrory agreed it was not 
Goodson’s signature on the 2002 deed. Goodson requested an order be 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Preston & Beaver v. Wilson, 1926 OK 267, 245 P. 34, 117 Okl. 68. 
 23. Hodge, 2019 OK CIV APP ¶12. 
 24. Goodson v. McCrory, 2018 OK CIV APP 59, 426 P.3d 636. 
 25. Id. ¶1. 
 26. Id. ¶2. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss2/19
2019] Oklahoma 221 
 
 
entered determining McCrory and Goodson own the property as joint 
tenants.27 
McCrory did not respond to Goodson’s motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, the trial court ruled the property vested in Goodson and McCrory 
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.28 McCrory then filed a motion 
for new trial contesting the trial court’s legal conclusion, although without 
disputing the underlying facts. McCrory argued she should own 75% of the 
property and Goodson should own the remaining 25% of the property as 
tenants in common.29 The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the 
case, disagreeing with both parties. 
Fist, the court cited the Oklahoma Supreme Court to explain how a joint 
tenancy is created: “A joint tenancy is created only when unities of time, title, 
interest, and possession are present…alteration of any required unity will 
destroy the joint tenancy.”30 Therefore, McCrory argued the 2002 deed 
destroyed the joint tenancy created by the 2001 deed.31 
In fact, the McGinnis court explained “if A and B hold as joint tenants and 
B, with or without the permission of A, conveys to C, the joint tenancy is 
destroyed because unity of interest is eliminated; the result is A and C hold 
as tenants in common,” one-half each.32 
However, only two of the four joint tenants conveyed their interests in the 
2002 deed. When at least two joint tenants do not convey their interests, “a 
conveyance by other joint tenants does not destroy the continuance of the 
joint tenancy among the remaining joint tenants, though it does destroy the 
joint tenancy as to the conveyed interests.”33 
“If A, B and C are joint tenants and C conveys to D, A and B continue as 
joint tenants in an undivided two-thirds of the whole estate and D has” the 
remaining one-third as a tenant in common with A and B.34 
Therefore, the appellate court explained the 2002 deed severed the joint 
tenancy as to the shares of Farquhar and Guzman and transferred their 
interests to McCrory outright. This made McCrory a tenant in common as to 
an undivided 1/2 interest in the property, being the interest acquired from 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. ¶3. 
 28. Id. ¶4. 
 29. Id. ¶ 5. 
 30. See Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Shawnee v. McGinnis, 1977 OK 47, ¶3, 571 P.2d 
1198.  
 31. Goodson, 2018 OK CIV APP ¶ 5, 426 P.3d at 638. 
 32. Id. ¶ 9. 
 33. Id. ¶ 10. 
 34. Id. 
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Farquhar and Guzman in the 2002 deed. However, Goodson and McCrory 
still own the remaining 1/2 interest in the property as joint tenants because 
they never severed their interests.35 The appellate court reversed and 
remanded the case, instructing the trial court to grant summary judgment to 
Goodson in a manner consistent with its decision. 
D. Tim Abraham v Palm Operating, LLC and Pacer Energy Marketing, 
LLC, 2019 OK CIV APP 46, 447 P.3d 486.36 
Palm Operating discussed which party is liable for paying production 
from a well under the Production Revenue Standards Act – an operator or a 
first purchaser of production. 
In February of 2016, Tim Abraham alleged he owned a 1/32 carried 
working interest in the Elias-Kerns No. 2 well. Palm Operating, LLC had 
been the operator of the well since May of 2009, and Pacer Energy Marketing 
had been the first purchaser of production from the well in January of 2010.37 
Abraham claimed he demanded payment of proceeds from Palm and Pacer 
but neither party paid him. Abraham alleged both defendants owed him 
interest on the unpaid proceeds in violation of the Production Revenue 
Standards Act (“PRSA”), actual and punitive damages for conversion, and 
restitution.38 
Pacer responded that it began purchasing crude oil from the well in 
December of 2010 and denied Abraham’s allegation. Pacer alleged any 
failure to make payment was because of Abraham’s negligence or Palm’s 
(operator) error.39 In January of 2018, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Abraham, and Pacer appealed. 
The parties agreed that Palm directed Pacer to pay Palm the working 
interest proceeds for the production Pacer took from the well. Abraham 
claimed Pacer owed him interest based title 52, section §570.10(E)(1): 
“Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this subsection, a first 
purchaser who fails to remit proceeds from the sale of oil or gas 
production to owners legally entitled thereto within the time 
limitation set forth in paragraph 1 of subsection B of this section 
shall be liable to such owners for interest as provided in subsection 
D of this section on that portion of the proceeds not timely paid. 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. ¶ 13. 
 36. Tim Abraham v. Palm Operating, LLC, 2019 OK CIV APP 46, 447 P.3d 486. 
 37. Id. ¶ 2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. ¶ 3. 
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When two or more persons fail to remit within such time 
limitations, liability for such interest shall be shared by those 
persons holding the proceeds in proportion to the time each person 
held such proceeds.”40 
Pacer responded it had no liability for the proceeds after it paid them to 
Palm, the operator, pursuant to 52 O.S. 2011 §570.10(C)(1): 
“A first purchaser that pays or causes to be paid proceeds from 
production to the producing owner of such production or, at the 
direction of the producing owners, pays or causes to be paid 
royalty proceeds from production to the royalty interest owners 
legally entitled thereto, or the operator of the well, shall not 
thereafter be liable for such proceeds so paid and shall have 
thereby discharged its duty to pay those proceeds on such 
production.”41 
Abraham argued section 570.10(C)(1) did not apply because Palm was not 
the producing owner of the production attributable to Abraham’s interest – 
Abraham owned that production himself. However, the appellate court noted 
if a first purchaser is required to directly pay each working interest owner, 
then parts of the PRSA would be superfluous.42 
For example, section 570.4 provides an operator acts in a purely 
ministerial capacity when it receives and disburses proceeds from producing 
owners; section 570.5 details how working interest owners may designate a 
party other than the operator to perform royalty accounting and remittance 
functions; and section 570.10(C)(1) defines producing owner as “an owner 
entitled to produce who during a given month produces oil or gas for its own 
account or the account of subsequently created interests as they burden his 
interest.” Abraham’s carried working interest specifically provided he would 
have no control over the leased premises or the operations.43 
Since Pacer paid its proceeds of production to Palm, the operator, the 
appellate court ruled Pacer had discharged its liability under section 
570.10(C)(1), and Abraham had no claim against Pacer. Therefore, the 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Abraham. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 570.10(E)(1) (2019)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. ¶ 8. 
 43. Id. 
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E. Estate of Stolba, 2019 OK CIV APP 43, 446 P.3d 528.44 
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals examined a will to determine what 
happens when a court is unable to figure out the testator’s intent. 
Margaret J. Stolba’s Will was admitted to probate in December of 2012 
and it included the following provision:45 
“The home stead will remain in trust, Not to be sold or split. All 
four of you have got to get along. Work it out, you should be able 
to have fun doing things there. Everyone should behave 
themselves.” 
The will also appointed co-personal representatives and gave them the 
power to sell any part of the estate without court approval, an apparent 
contradiction to the excerpt above preventing the homestead from being 
“sold or split.” 
Probate was still open in January of 2017, and Mark S. Stolba, one of the 
decedent’s sons, filed an application to distribute the homestead to the 
decedent’s four children equally, in accordance with intestate rules of 
succession. Mark alleged either the trust failed for lack of required elements, 
or the homestead provision quoted above created an unenforceable restriction 
on alienation.46 
In October of 2017, the district court distributed the homestead per the 
rules of intestacy. The estate’s personal representative, Daniel Lowther, filed 
a motion for a new trial. The court denied that motion and Lowther appealed. 
The appellate court explained the main question is whether the “trust” 
provision represents an “unenforceable perpetual ban on the alienation of real 
property.”47 After dispensing with Lowther’s jurisdictional arguments, the 
court explained how the homestead provision apparently violated the first 
part of title 60, section 175.47 (Suspension of absolute power of alienation – 
period of suspension): 
“A. Except as otherwise provided in subsection B of this section, 
the absolute power of alienation of real and personal property, or 
either of them, shall not be suspended by any limitations or 
conditions whatever for a longer period than during the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Estate of Stolba, 2019 OK CIV APP 43, 446 P.3d 528. 
 45. Id. ¶ 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. ¶ 6. 
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continuance of a life or lives of the beneficiaries in being at the 
creation of the estate and twenty-one (21) years thereafter.”48 
The court ruled not allowing the homestead to be sold or split violated 
section 175.47 because it had no time limitation.49 However, Lowther argued 
the second part of section 175.47 should apply: “The absolute power of 
alienation is not suspended if there is any person in being who, alone or in 
combination with one or more others, has the power to sell, exchange, or 
otherwise convey the real or personal property.”50 
Lowther argued even though the homestead is not to be sold, the will also 
gave the personal representatives the power to sell any part of the estate. In 
response, the court ruled the will’s specific restraint on alienation would 
control over the personal representatives’ general power of sale.51 
Next, Lowther argued the court should rewrite the homestead clause of the 
will so it complies with section 175.47 pursuant to section 75 (“Reformation 
of interests violating rule against perpetuities”)52 and section 77 
(“Reformation of offending instruments”).53 However, the court declined to 
rewrite the will, holding this case involved a restraint on alienation, not a 
perpetuity.54 
“Restraints upon alienation where there are no provisions for forfeiture or 
reversion are ‘disabling restraints’ and void.”55 Sections 75 and 77 apply 
when an interest may vest too late, but they do not apply to restraints on 
alienation.56 A court cannot just shorten the vesting period to affect the 
testator’s wishes; if the testator intends an absolute restriction on alienation, 
no one can reform that restriction and maintain the testator’s intent. 
In establishing its role in analyzing a will, the court cited In re Prather’s 
Estate: “The rule of construction that the intent of the testator must be carried 
out if possible does not authorize courts to make a new will to conform to 
what they may think the testator intended. The intent of the testator must be 
ascertained from the will as it stands.”57 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.47 (2019)). 
 49. Id. ¶ 14. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. ¶ 16. 
 52. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75 (2019). 
 53. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 77 (2019). 
 54. Estate of Stolba, 2019 OK CIV APP ¶¶ 17-18, 446 P.3d at 532. 
 55. Id. ¶ 19 (quoting Shields v. Moffit, 1984 OK 42, ¶26, 683 P.2d 530, 534.) 
 56. Id. ¶ 20. 
 57. Id. ¶ 22 (citing 1974 OK CIV APP 24, 527 P.2d 211, 215 n.4). 
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The court pointed out even if the testator intended his homestead to be sold 
after a certain time period, she does not specify how that property would be 
distributed at that time, and the will did not include a residual beneficiary. 
The court held even if the restraint on alienation could be reformed, no court 
could rewrite the will without guessing at the testator’s intent.58 Therefore, 
the court affirmed the district court and distributed the homestead property 
per the rules of intestacy. 
II. Federal Cases 
A. Rhea v Apache Corporation, No. CIV-14-0433-JH, 2019 WL 1548909 
(E.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2019).59 
The Eastern District of Oklahoma certified a class action in a case 
concerning underpayment of royalties and whether or not royalty owner 
should be paid for natural gas liquids. 
Bigie Lee Rhea filed a class action on behalf of himself and other royalty 
owners with interests in Oklahoma wells operated by Apache Corporation. 
Rhea alleged Apache underpaid royalties by failing to obtain the best price 
available for the gas it sold and produced.60 Specifically, Rhea claims: 
[Apache] breached its implied duty to market gas and obtain the 
best price available by (1) marketing the gas under a ‘keep whole’ 
contract which did not capture the value of the natural gas liquids 
(‘NGLs’) included in the production, and (2) paying excessive 
fees to the midstream processor even after the keep whole contract 
was modified to capture the value of the NGL’s [sic].61  
Additionally, Rhea alleged Apache failed to pay royalty on fuel gas used to 
perform midstream services, despite contrary language in most of the 
affected leases.62 Rhea made claims for breach of contract, tortious breach of 
contract, fraud (actual and constructive), deceit, and for an accounting.63 
On January 1, 1998, Apache entered into two contracts for gas sales from 
Oklahoma wells (the “1998 Contracts”).64 A Gathering and Compression 
Agreement covered gas wells connected to various pipeline systems owned 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. ¶ 23. 
 59. Rhea v. Apache Corp., 2019 WL 1548909 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 15, 2019). 
 60. Id. at *1. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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or operated by Transok, Inc.65 A Dedicated Interruptible Service Agreement 
covered gas wells connected to two more pipeline systems owned by 
Transok.66 The 1998 Contracts, which were due to expire at the end of 2012:  
[D]edicated all future wells drilled or recompleted within five 
miles of one of the pipeline systems to the relevant agreement, 
required Transok to deliver “thermally equivalent” volumes of gas 
for the account of defendant after NGLs and other substances 
were removed during processing. . . and reserved the right to 
defendant to “process all of its gas and retain all of the oil and 
liquid hydrocarbons.”67 
The 1998 Contracts are described as “keep-whole” contracts where an 
operator allows the midstream company to process the gas to remove the 
NGLs and keep those liquids for its own use or sale.68 The midstream 
company keeps the operator “whole” by delivering a “thermally equivalent” 
amount of residue gas to the operator after processing. Apache paid royalties 
based on the residue gas.69 
Rhea alleged that under this type of contract, a royalty owner is not paid 
on the best price available for the gas sold by its operator.70 The value of the 
NGLs removed exceeds the value of the residue gas returned to the operator. 
The difference between these values is called the “NGL uplift.”71 Therefore, 
Rhea claimed Apache paid royalties based on a lower price than if the NGLs 
had not been removed from the gas – Rhea did not receive value for the 
NGLs.72 Apache argued “the contracts were reasonable based on the 
circumstances existing at the time.”73 
On July 1, 2011, Apache entered into a Gas Gathering and Processing 
Agreement (the “2011 Contract”) with Enogex Gathering and Processing.74 
Under this contract, Apache received value for the NGLs and paid royalties 
based on that value, distinguishing this contract from the 1998 Contracts.75 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at *2. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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However, Rhea alleged the 2011 Contract included unreasonable fees which 
“improperly diminished the amount of royalties paid to the class.”76 
Rhea presented a lease chart (5,679 total leases) to the court and claimed, 
“none of the leases negate the duty to pay the best price available for the 
gas.”77 Also, Rhea argued 4,159 leases include express language that royalty 
will be paid on all constituents of gas produced, 538 leases expressly allow 
for the deduction of various post-production costs, and 4,824 of the leases 
mandate Apache pay royalty on “fuel gas,” gas used to power gathering, 
compressing, and processing equipment off the lease premises.78 Rhea claims 
Apache never paid royalties on the fuel gas.79 
Rhea represented a class of:  
All non-excluded persons or entities with royalty interests in wells 
with a Btu content of 1050 or higher where Apache Corporation 
marketed gas from the well pursuant to the terms of the January 
1, 1998 contracts between Transok, Inc. and Apache Corporation 
and/or the July 1, 2011 contract between Enogex Gathering & 
Processing LLC and Apache Corporation on or after January 1, 
2000.80  
This class was meant to include only those parties whose gas contained NGLs 
at the time it was produced.81 
To determine whether or not to certify the proposed class, the court set out 
the requirements to certify a class action under Rule 23 of the federal rules 
of civil procedure: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy, and 
predominance and superiority.82 
Numerosity – The plaintiff must show the “class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable.”83 Given the number of wells, the 
court noted the class could include more than 5,000 persons, easily satisfying 
the numerosity requirement.84 
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Commonality – Rhea needs to show there are “questions of law or fact 
common to the class.” Determining this common question must “resolve an 
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”85 
Rhea argued common questions included: 
 (1) whether defendant owed a uniform duty to pay royalties on 
the best price available for the gas; (2) whether defendant used a 
uniform royalty payment methodology; (3) whether defendant’s 
royalty payment methodology breached the duty to pay royalties 
on the best price available; (4) whether subclass leases contained 
an express lease clause that required the payment of royalty on 
fuel gas; (5) whether defendant breached the fuel gas clause; and 
(6) whether an elevated fee initially charged under the 2011 
contract breached duties to the class.86 
In response, Apache argued the commonality question in this type of case 
was answered in Foster v. Apache Corp.87 In Foster, the plaintiff attempted 
to certify a class of more than 10,000 royalty owners in more than 1,200 
wells.88 However, that case involved gas sales under 30 different marketing 
arrangements with numerous purchasers.89 The Foster court ruled the 
plaintiff failed to establish commonality because of variations in lease 
languages.90 
The court distinguished this case from Foster because here Rhea claimed 
the leases had something in common: none of the leases included language 
negating Apache’s duty to obtain the best price available for the gas.91 The 
court determined this pointed towards a collective resolution. “[W]hether 
defendant had a uniform duty to pay royalties on the best price available, 
used a uniform royalty payment method to pay those royalties, and, in doing 
so, breached the duty to pay royalties on the best price available are all 
questions common to the proposed class.”92 
The court dismissed Apache’s other arguments against commonality 
regarding fuel gas provisions in the leases and whether or not the processing 
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fee in the 2011 Contract was excessive.93 However, the court did note part of 
the proceedings may not be appropriate for class-wide resolution: Apache’s 
evidence that not all gas produced from the wells was processed to extract 
NGLs.94 Therefore, the court found Rhea’s proposed class of “persons with 
royalty interests in wells with a Btu content of 1050 or higher” as overly 
broad because it could include “rich gas” wells where NGLs were not 
removed. If NGLs were not removed, Rhea’s claim for lost royalty would 
fail.95 
However, the court ruled this meant only that it would modify the class 
instead of decertifying it altogether.96 The court decided the class should be 
“only those wells whose gas was actually processed.”97 
Typicality and Adequacy – Apache argued Rhea’s claims were not 
typical of the rest of the class. Apache noted Rhea’s lease is a “market value 
at the wellhead lease” which has been “held to require royalties to be paid on 
the condition of the gas at the wellhead before processing.”98 However, the 
court pointed out this did not negate Rhea’s argument “that the value of the 
gas at the wellhead would include the value of the NGLs contained therein.”99 
Also, Apache argued Rhea was paid differently than other class members 
because his lease prevented deductions for post-production costs.100 But 
Apache acknowledged that prior to 2012, it did not distinguish between 
royalty owners whose leases allowed for such deductions and those that did 
not.101 As a result, such costs were deducted from all class members, meaning 
Rhea was treated the same as the rest of the class despite any differences in 
lease language.102 
Predominance and Superiority – Apache argued individual questions 
predominate the class because of the varying obligations and contracts 
typically involved in royalty underpayment cases.103 In response, Rhea 
claimed this is not a typical royalty underpayment case. Rhea did not argue 
when the gas became marketable or whether or not the processing costs were 
reasonable; Rhea only requested “royalties to be paid on the value of the 
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residue gas plus the value of the NGLs removed during the processing[.]”104 
This would be Rhea’s best price available for the gas. He argued Mittelstaedt 
v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc. would not apply to this case.105 
However, the court noted that under the 1998 Contracts, “the value of the 
NGLs appears to have been transferred to the midstream processor as at least 
a partial fee for processing.”106 According to the court, Mittelstaedt would 
therefore apply to this case and “operators may charge post-production costs 
to the lessor if (1) once the gas is in a marketable condition; (2) the post-
production costs enhanced the value of the gas; (3) the costs are reasonable; 
and (4) the costs increased royalties proportionally.”107 Usually, it is not 
possible to determine when gas becomes marketable on a class-wide basis, 
thus defeating class certification. However, this issue is not present because 
Rhea did not contest whether the gas was marketable at the wellhead. 
Rhea does not challenge the fees charged by the midstream processor; 
Rhea only argued Apache should pay royalties on the NGL uplift.108 The 
court ruled the NGL fee is the only fee at issue, and it is charged against all 
class members uniformly.109 Therefore, the questions are “whether 
evaluation of the value of the NGLs as fees enhanced the value of the residue 
gas, whether that was a reasonable fee, and whether royalties increased in 
proportion to that value[.]”110 The court determined these common questions 
predominated over any individual questions.111  
Since Rhea met the four requirements for class certification, the court 
granted Rhea’s motion for class certification as modified. 
B. Naylor Farms, Inc. v Chaparral Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d 779 (10th Cir. 
2019).112 
Naylor is another federal case concerning a potential class action 
involving deduction of gas treatment costs. The Western District of 
Oklahoma granted plaintiff’s motion to certify, and the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed. 
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Under Oklahoma law, Chaparral Energy, LLC and other lessees have an 
implied duty of marketability (“IDM”), or “a duty to provide a marketable 
production available to market.”113 Raw or unprocessed gas typically must 
undergo field processes such as gathering compressing, dehydrating, 
transporting, and producing (GCDTP services) to make it marketable.114 
Therefore, in Oklahoma, lessees usually bear the costs for those services.115 
Invoking this duty, Naylor Farms, Inc. sued Chaparral and asserted claims 
for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, and 
failure to produce in paying quantities.116 Naylor claimed Chaparral 
improperly deducted GCDTP service costs from royalties paid to Naylor and 
other royalty owners.117 Specifically, Naylor alleged Chaparral agreed to 
wellhead sales contracts with midstream processing companies wherein the 
midstream processor would acquire title/possession of the gas at or near the 
wellhead, but it would not pay Chaparral for the gas until after it had 
completed the GCDTP services.118 
Once those services were completed, Naylor claimed “the midstream 
companies (1) take the gross proceeds they receive from the downstream 
sales; (2) deduct from those gross proceeds the costs and fees associated with 
performing the GCDTP services; and (3) pay Chaparral for the gas they 
previously acquired at the wellhead by giving Chaparral the resulting net 
proceeds.”119 Then Chaparral paid royalties based on the net proceeds 
received from the midstream processor, instead of paying royalties based on 
the gross proceeds the processor received from the downstream sales.120 
Naylor alleged that as a result, Chaparral forced the royalty owners to pay 
their share of the costs to transform the gas into a marketable product.121 
Naylor argued class certification for it and other similarly situated royalty 
owners was appropriate “because (1) whether Chaparral breached the IDM 
is a common question, and (2) this and other common questions predominate 
over any individual ones.”122 
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Chaparral responded that an alleged breach of the IDM is not a common 
question because an answer would require reviewing the language in each 
separate lease and the gas produced from each separate well.123 Also, 
Chaparral argued these specialized questions predominate over any common 
questions, and therefore, Naylor can not satisfy the requirements for class 
certification.124 The district court disagreed with Chaparral and granted 
Naylor’s motion to certify, ruling Naylor “identified at least one common 
question: whether Chaparral breached the IDM.”125 
On appeal, Chaparral made three arguments: (1) marketability is an 
individual question which necessarily predominates over any common 
questions; (2) distinctions in lease language give rise to individual questions 
which predominate over common ones; and (3) in the absence of evidence 
that Chaparral uses a uniform payment methodology, certification is 
inappropriate.126 
1. Marketability 
Naylor argued Chaparral breached the IDM by charging royalty owners 
their share of the costs for the GCDTP services. The court notes both parties 
agree the issue is when the gas becomes marketable. However, the parties 
disagree whether they need an individual analysis of each well to answer this 
issue.127 
To decide whether class certification is appropriate, the court gave an 
overview of Oklahoma state law concerning when gas becomes 
marketable.128 The court cited Mittelstaedt for gas marketability, but noted 
this case differs in that it deals with wellhead sales contracts.129 Therefore, in 
the absence of Oklahoma Supreme Court (“OSC”) authority on the specific 
issue at hand, the court indicated it must predict how the OSC would rule.130 
Of course, the court looked to Mittelstaedt to answer that question.131 
In Mittelstaedt, the OSC explained the IDM forces lessees to provide a 
marketable product, and raw or unprocessed gas must usually undergo 
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GCDTP services to make it marketable.132 Therefore, the OSC ruled if those 
services are necessary to make the gas marketable, then the lessee must bear 
the costs of those services. However, if the gas is in a marketable condition 
at the wellhead, and the lessee has those GCDTP services performed to 
increase the value of the gas, then the lessee may charge those costs to the 
royalty owner under certain circumstances.133 
Now the court did note that Mittelstaedt did not define the term 
“marketable,” and it did not identify the factors which determine when and 
where gas becomes marketable.134 The court also pointed out the OSC has 
declined to answer those questions in a couple 2018 cases: Whisenant v Strat 
Land Expl. Co. and Pummill v. Hancock. However, the Oklahoma Court of 
Civil Appeals (“OCOCA”) reached decisions in both cases. 
In Whisenant, the OCOCA held the “answer to the marketability question 
will always turn, at least in part, on the quality of the gas at issue.”135 This 
means an individualized, fact-intensive review would be necessary to 
determine if a lessee breached the IDM. 
However, in Pummill, the OCOCA ruled it may be possible to determine 
gas marketability without such a review.136 In that case, the gas was not 
marketable at the wellhead and it was not sold until it was transferred into a 
pipeline. Therefore, the operator was “not in the wellhead market,” but rather 
in the high-pressure pipeline market.137 In that case, the OCOCA focused on 
when the gas was first capable of being sold into the market in which the 
operator chose to participate138 – “gas becomes marketable when it’s subject 
to an actual sale.”139 In Naylor, the plaintiffs argued Chaparral sold its gas at 
the pipeline, not at the wellhead, and therefore the gas had to undergo at least 
one GCDTP service to become marketable, or sold into the pipeline, making 
Chaparral more like the lessee in Pummill.140 
It may appear that the OCOCA issued two opposite rulings in these cases. 
In Whisenant, the court held an individualized review may be necessary to 
determine if a lessee breached an IDM,141 while in Pummill, the court held 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Mittelstaedt, 1998 OK ¶¶ 20-21, 954 P.2d at 1208.  
 133. Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 785-86. 
 134. Id. at 786. 
 135. Whisenant v. Strat Land Expl. Co., 2018 OK CIV APP 65, 429 P.3d 703. 
 136. Pummill v. Hancock Expl. LLC, 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268. 
 137. Id. ¶ 36, 419 P.3d at 1278. 
 138. Id. ¶ 44, 419 P.3d at 1279. 
 139. Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 788. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Whisenant, 2018 OK CIV APP 65, 429 P.3d 703. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss2/19
2019] Oklahoma 235 
 
 
such a review would be unnecessary.142 However, the 10th Circuit pointed 
out the Whisenant court left open the possibility that a fact-intensive review 
may not be necessary in all cases, and the Pummill case fit in that open 
space.143 
After reviewing these Oklahoma court decisions, the court turned to 
analyzing Rule 23’s certification requirements, and decided only two of those 
are at issue: commonality and predominance.144 The district court ruled 
whether Chaparral breached the IDM was a common question which 
predominated over any other questions.145 To do so, it narrowed the class to 
“only those royalty owners whose leases contain clauses that are similar to 
the royalty clauses (collectively, Mittelstaedt Clauses) the OSC considered 
in three cases: (1) Mittelstaedt, (2) TXO Production Corp, v State ex rel. 
Commissioners of Land Office…and (3) Wood v TXO Production 
Corp.[.]”146 Since the OSC held these clauses do not negate the IDM, the 
district court ruled “any remaining variations in lease language do not defeat 
commonality or predominance.”147 
Regarding Chaparral’s argument that the court must determine when the 
gas from each well became marketable, the district court ruled that would be 
unnecessary because all of the gas in question required at least one GCDTP 
service to become marketable.148 The class does not include gas which was 
already marketable at the wellhead. Therefore, the court ruled marketability 
in this case is subject to class-wide proof because variations in the quality of 
the gas are irrelevant to the predominant question.149 
2. Lease Language 
Next, Chaparral argued the language in each lease would have to be 
analyzed separately, thus defeating commonality and predominance. The 
district court disagreed, holding this type of analysis would be unnecessary 
because it limited the class to leases with Mittelstaedt clauses.150 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Pummill, 2018 OK CIV APP 48, 419 P.3d 1268. 
 143. Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 788. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 784. 
 146. Id. at 790. 
 147. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 794. 
 150. Id. at 795. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
236 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
Chaparral argued the district court merely relied on Naylor’s claims that 
the leases in questions contain Mittelstaedt clauses.151 The Tenth Circuit 
disagreed, noting Naylor prepared a lease chart categorizing the different 
language in each lease because that was what it was supposed to do.152 Also, 
the district court independently verified the chart was “generally accurate.” 
Additionally, Chaparral did not provide evidence that Naylor’s lease chart 
was inaccurate.153 
Chaparral also argued the leases included different royalty provisions and 
the leases were ambiguous; this ambiguity would allow the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence. However, the court pointed out Chaparral waived its 
extrinsic evidence argument because it did not preserve it on appeal and 
failed to adequately brief it anyway.154 
3. Uniform Payment Methodology 
Finally, Chaparral argued Naylor did not demonstrate Chaparral used a 
uniform payment methodology to calculate royalty payments and “this lack 
of a common payment methodology defeats class certification.”155 The court 
noted that while existence of such a methodology is not enough to establish 
predominance by itself, its existence is also not necessary to establish 
predominance.156 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to 
certify the class action and held Chaparral failed to show how the lower 
court’s decision fell outside the bounds of “rationally available choices.”157 
C. Davilla v Enable Midstream Partners L.P., 913 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 
2019). 
Davilla dealt with the ramifications of the expiration of a pipeline 
easement on Native American lands, and whether a landowner must first 
demand removal of the pipeline before it can prove a trespass.158 
Enable owned and operated a natural gas pipeline which crossed Native 
American allotted lands in Anadarko, Oklahoma.159 The pipeline was built 
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pursuant to a 20 year term easement which expired in 2000.160 Enable never 
renewed the easement and they never removed the pipeline. Therefore, some 
Native American Allottees sued Enable for trespass, arguing Enable had no 
right to be on the land once the term expired.161 The Western District of 
Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the Allottees, ruling Enable 
trespassed on the land.162 The district court also issued a permanent 
injunction and ordered Enable to remove the pipeline.163 The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the summary judgment, reversed the permanent injunction, and 
remanded for further proceedings.164 
The Court described the various federal laws enacted in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries aimed at Native American assimilation.165 
Congress divided Native American reservations into allotments and assigned 
parcels of land to individual Native Americans.166 However, many Native 
Americans lost their lands through dubious or fraudulent transactions, so 
Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934.167 This Act ended 
the allotment period in favor of the federal government holding the allotted 
lands in trust for the benefit of the individual Native Americans 
indefinitely.168 This did not affect lands the government had already patented, 
so while some Native Americans owned their lands in fee, other adjacent 
Native American landowners may have only “owned” their lands subject to 
a trust in favor of the government.169 The land at issue in this case was allotted 
in 1901 to a Kiowa woman named Emaugobah, but because she never 
received a patent for the land, the government held it in trust.170 
While the population moved west across the Great Plains, Congress passed 
several right-of-way statutes.171 They empowered the Secretary of the 
Interior to approve easements across all lands held in trust for individual 
Native Americans or Native American tribes.172 However, if an allotment 
was shared between multiple Native Americans, the Secretary needed 
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consent of a “majority of the [equitable] interests” to grant the right-of-
way.173 
So, in 1980, the Secretary approved a 25 foot wide pipeline easement 
across a portion of Emaugobah’s allotment for a 20 year term.174 Same 
expired in 2000 and Enable, who acquired the easement from the original 
owner, tried to secure a new 20 year easement from the Allottees and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.175 However, Enable never gained approval from a 
majority of the allottees and the Bureau canceled their application for the new 
easement.176 Since Enable continued to operate the pipeline, some of the 
Allottees sued claiming Enable was trespassing on their land and demanded 
the pipeline be removed.177 
On appeal, Enable argued the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the trespass claims and in issuing a permanent injunction to 
enforce the ruling.178  
1. Summary Judgment 
a) Consent as a Defense to Trespass 
The Tenth Circuit noted it reviews a summary judgment ruling by asking 
if there is a genuine issue of material fact, and all evidence is construed in 
favor of the movant.179 However, the court pointed out federal law 
complicates this issue.180 Federal law must govern when Native American 
allotted lands are at issue, but Congress has not created a federal right of 
action for trespass.181 Therefore, the court must look at “federal common 
law.” However, the court “lack[ed] a federal body of trespass law to protect 
the Allottees’ federal property interests, [it] must borrow state law to the 
extent it comports with federal policy.”182 
In Oklahoma, a trespass occurs when one person physically invades 
someone else’s property without the permission of the person in lawful 
possession of that property.183 This led the court to consider three elements 
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related to a trespass: (1) the Allottees must be entitled to possession of the 
allotment; (2) they must show “Enable physically entered or remained on the 
allotment;” and (3) the Allottees must show Enable had no legal right to 
remain on the allotment.184 
Enable argued it had consent sufficient to show it could maintain the 
pipeline even after the 20-year term expired.185 In Nahno-Lopez, the court 
held “consent forms a complete defense to trespass” under Oklahoma law.186 
In 2004, Enable obtained written consent forms from five of the thirty-seven 
allottees allowing the company to maintain the pipeline.187 Despite not 
obtaining consent from anywhere near 50% of the allottees, Enable argued 
this effort at least created a material fact sufficient to defeat a summary 
judgment motion.188 
After pointing out Enable had confused the law on trespass, the court noted 
federal law dictates the prerequisites to obtain a right-of-way: Enable must 
secure the right-of-way from the Secretary of the Interior, who must have the 
allottees’ approval.189 Until that process is completed, Enable has no right to 
enter the land or continue operating the pipeline.190 In other words, even if 
Enable obtained consent forms from every allottee, it still needed the 
Secretary to approve the easement.191 
Turning to common law, Enable attempted to equate the several allottees 
with tenants in common, arguing a single owner may enter into a lease 
without the co-owner’s consent.192 The court held these allottees are not 
traditional tenants in common and Enable did not provide any persuasive 
authority anyway.193  
The court held the undisputed facts (expiration of the easement) showed 
Enable had no right to be on the land. Obtaining a few consent forms did not 
change this fact, so the court affirmed the summary judgment motion.194 
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b) Demand for Removal 
Enable argued it had no duty to remove the pipeline because the Allottees 
never demanded the pipeline be removed.195 In response, the court noted 
Enable did not raise this argument at the district court level.196 Enable argued 
the Allottees never included the demand for removal in their briefs, so Enable 
did not respond to same.197 However, the 10th Circuit held even an 
“incomplete view of the law” may support a summary judgment motion, and 
it is not up to the court to fill in the blanks for the movant if it is not necessary 
to the ruling.198 
However, the court noted Oklahoma case law has not established a 
demand requirement, instead turning to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to 
show “the lapse of any specified period of time by which the consent is 
restricted” would terminate consent.199 “According to these rules, the 
easement’s expiration created a duty to remove the pipeline.”200 
2. Permanent Injunction 
Regarding the district court’s awarding of a permanent injunction, Enable 
argued the lower court “incorporated a simplified injunction rule from 
Oklahoma law when it should have adhered to basic tenants of federal equity 
jurisprudence.”201 The Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the injunction 
order.202 
The lower court applied Oklahoma law to determine “equity will restrain 
a continuing trespass,” but it should have applied the usual four-factor test 
federal courts use to grant permanent injunctive relief.203 Whether a federal 
court should apply state law to a matter is rarely a black and white issue, but 
the Tenth Circuit held this case presented “a distinct need for nationwide 
legal standards.”204 The federal right-of-way statute applies to all lands held 
in trust by the United States, and “the nationwide application of this right-of-
way statute suggests a need for a uniform federal standard.”205 
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Since the Secretary of the Interior has power over lands in multiple states, 
the court ruled it would be helpful to treat easement holders in Oklahoma the 
same as easement holders in Kansas.206 Therefore, the district court should 
have applied the federal permanent-injunction standard. The lower court 
should consider “(1) whether an injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable 
harm, (2) whether the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the 
injunction may cause to the enjoined party, and (3) whether the injunction 
would adversely affect the public interest.”207 Therefore, the court reversed 
the permanent injunction and remanded so the lower court could apply the 
federal standard instead of the state test.208 
III. State Regulatory Developments 
A. Oklahoma Corporation Commission Regulatory Updates 
On May 28, 2019, the Governor approved revised permanent rules 
promulgated by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the 
“Commission”),209 which became effective on August 1, 2019, and made 
numerous revisions and updates to Commission rules affecting oil and gas 
development. Notable changes include the following: 
(a) Okla. Admin. Code Section 165:10-3-5, which pertains to drilling, 
completion, recompletion, and remedial operations on wells 
located within the boundaries of underground storage facilities, 
was amended to require that well operators provide notice of an 
application for a Permit to Drill a well to the storage operators and 
the Director of the Public Utility Division as part of the 
application for Permit to Drill process if (i) the proposed well falls 
within one mile of the certified boundary of an underground 
storage facility or (ii) the completion intervals for the proposed 
well will, at any point, be located within 600 feet of an 
underground storage facility. Under the revised rule, notices 
required prior to logging, plugging and casing operations must 
now be provided at least 48 hours in advance. The revised rule 
also requires cement plugs for noncommercial wells to cover not 
less than 300 feet (previously 100 feet) below the base to not less 
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than 300 feet (previously 100 feet) above the top of the 
underground storage facility.210 
(b) Okla. Admin. Code Section 165:10-3-10, which pertains to well 
completion operations, was revised to require operators to notify 
the operator of a producing spacing unit or well within one mile 
(previously one-half mile) of the perforated interval of the 
proposed well within five days of obtaining Conservation 
Division authorization to use diesel fuel as the base fluid for 
hydraulic fracturing operations. Prior to the 2019 revisions, 
operators were also required to provide five business days notice 
prior to the commencement of hydraulic fracturing operations on 
a horizontal well to operators of producing wells located within 
one-half mile of the completion interval of the subject well that 
were completed in the same common source of supply as the 
horizontal well. Under the revised rule, operators must notify 
operators of producing wells located within one mile of the 
completion interval of the subject well, regardless of whether such 
wells were completed in the same common source of supply as 
the horizontal well.211 
(c) Okla. Admin Code Section 165:10-3-15, which pertains to the 
venting and flaring of gas, was revised to include a new 
requirement that operators notify the appropriate Conservation 
Division District Office or Field Inspector within 24 hours of 
initiating the flaring of gas with an H2S content exceeding 100 
ppm. The revised rule also (i) extends the temporary permit 
exemption period for gas vented or flared in excess of 50 mcf/day 
during initial flowback from a newly completed or recompleted 
well from 14 days to 21 days, and (ii) extends the temporary 
permit exemption period for gas vented or flared in excess of 50 
mcf/day after initial flowback from a newly completed or 
recompleted well from 30 days to 45 days.212 
(d) Okla. Admin. Code Section 165:10-3-16, which pertains to oil and 
gas operations in hydrogen sulfide areas, was revised to expand 
the scope of operations subject to the rule. The revised rule lowers 
existing ppm thresholds to increase the rule’s applicability, and 
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new ppm thresholds are added. Safety measures applicable to 
townsites and cities are now applicable to rural residential 
subdivisions. Under the revised rule, the Commission may now 
impose fines of up to $5,000 for violations.213 
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